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Introduction  
Until the late 1950s, companies in both the North and the South practiced discrimination openly. 
Women, African-Americans, and Latinos were rarely given opportunities to work alongside 
white men in the same jobs. They were generally offered unskilled jobs without promotion 
prospects.
2  Most unions were segregated by sex and race, and those that had access to the best-
paying jobs were the exclusive province of white men.
3   
In 1961, John F. Kennedy decreed that companies wanting to do business with the federal 
government would have to take affirmative action to end discrimination.
4 In 1964, Lyndon 
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act, outlawing discrimination in all U.S. workplaces.
5  In 
principle, Kennedy’s affirmative action order and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made 
discrimination illegal in corporations. In practice, most employers did not think these federal 
regulations would much affect them. They assumed that putting an end to outright discrimination 
would be enough to comply with federal regulations.
6 
The modest legal requirements, vague notions of compliance and waxing and waning 
enforcement meant that progress at the workplace would depend on an expanding class of 
personnel managers who devised a series of compliance measures.
7 They installed new 
recruitment and training programs in the 1960s, formal hiring and promotion systems in the 
1970s, diversity management programs in the 1980s, and work-family and anti-harassment 
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2 See generally FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 22-31 (2010); RUTH MILKMAN, GENDER AT 
WORK: THE DYNAMICS OF JOB SEGREGATION BY SEX DURING WORLD WAR II 1-11 (1987); BARBARA RESKIN & 
PATRICIA ROOS, JOB QUEUES AND GENDER QUEUES 4-5 (1990).  
3 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 25-26; BARBARA RESKIN & PATRICIA ROOS, JOB QUEUES AND GENDER QUEUES 56 (1990) 
(discussing the role of unions in excluding women and minorities from the skilled trades in order to prevent 
competition for jobs). 
4 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977, 3 C.F.R. 87 (1961). 
5 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). 
6 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 1. 
7 Id. at 1-5. 4	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programs in the 1990s and beyond.
8 By experimenting with these new personnel programs 
corporations played a crucial role in mediating the effects of anti-discrimination laws.    
American corporations made substantial progress on race and gender integration of the 
workplace between the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the end of the 1970s, but 
progress slowed during the 1980s as the federal government cut back significantly on Title VII 
enforcement.
9 While minorities made inroads into management, research shows they were 
especially vulnerable to layoffs during the corporate restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s.
10  In 
the half-century since the civil rights era, women and members of racial and ethnic minority 
groups have continued to face significant barriers to entering the ranks of management.
11 In 
some industries, the representation of white men in management has actually grown over time.
12  
The need to understand what policies and programs are effective in bringing women and 
minorities into the workforce and into management positions thus remains as pressing as ever. 
Thanks to variation across firms in the use of innovations, we can explore both what 
leads a corporation to adopt progressive employment programs and which programs have 
actually increased the number of women and minorities on the staff as a whole and in 
management.  We treat programs as progressive when they are adopted under the banner of 
equalizing employment opportunities or promoting workforce diversity, regardless of whether 
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8 Id. at 13-14. 
9 Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Catherine Zimmer, Kevin Stainback, Corre Robinson, Tiffany Taylor & Tricia 
McTague, Documenting Desegregation: Segregation in American Workplaces by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 1966-
2003, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 565, 567 (2006). 
10 George Wilson & Debra Branch McBrier, Race and Loss of Privilege: African American/White Differences in the 
Determinants of Job Layoffs From Upper-Tier Occupations, 20 SOC. FOR. 301 (2005). Kalev Alexandra, How You 
Downsize is Who you Downsize Working paper, Department of Sociology, Tel Aviv University.  
11 See DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, GENDER & RACIAL INEQUALITY AT WORK: THE SOURCES & CONSEQUENCES 
OF JOB SEGREGATION 21-37 (1993) (presenting data showing a lower composition of women and minorities in 
manager and supervisor positions). 
12 KEVIN STAINBACK & DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY,  Documenting Desegregation: Segregation in Private Sector 
Employment since the Civil Rights Act,  262  (forthcoming 2011). (Frank or Sandra may send the book manuscript to 
the editors if you have it. Or we may find other sources) 5	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managerial intention was to comply with the law or to actually improve the lot of the historically 
disadvantaged.  We might have defined some of these measures as simple compliance measures 
and others as true progressive employment policies. For example, among the programs designed 
to comply with the law were active recruitment programs targeting historically black colleges, 
predominantly black high schools, and women’s colleges.
13  Among the programs thought to be 
shaped by progressive goals rather than driven by regulation, are diversity training and 
mentoring systems.
14   But demarcating clear lines between symbol and substance would involve 
attributing intent to the managers who put these programs into place. It would also ignore 
unintended program consequences. In all likelihood, some managers hoping to promote equality 
of opportunity used the cover of compliance to put into place policies that they favored for their 
progressive purposes.  At the same time, some managers hoping to appear forward-thinking to 
regulators and judges implemented diversity programs without any true intention of altering the 
status quo, but some of those programs may have promoted diversity nonetheless.  Rather than 
trying to divine the intentions of managers, we include all of these policies under the broad 
umbrella of progressive employment policies. 
As organizational sociologists, rather than legal scholars, our approach is to try to 
understand the causes of adoption of corporate diversity programs and the effects of these 
progressive innovations using quantitative data from studies of hundreds of firms over dozens of 
years.  Most of the studies we review (several of which are our own) use advanced statistical 
techniques and longitudinal data to isolate the causes of progressive innovations in firms or to 
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13 See E.G. MATTISON, Integrating the Work Force in Southern Industry, in THE NEGRO AND EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY:  PROBLEMS AND  PRACTICES 147, 151-52 (Herbert R. Northrup & Richard L. Rowan eds., 1965) 
(describing Lockheed’s outreach to colleges and high schools to recruit black students). 
14 See Dobbin, supra note 2, at 16-17 (noting that during the 1980s, personnel experts “dropped the language of 
legal compliance” and instead used ideas from the social sciences to promote diversity training and mentoring as 
ways of reducing the effects of bias and stereotyping). 6	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isolate the effects of those innovations on workforce integration.
15 Survey researchers and 
business groups such as Catalyst and the Society for Human Resources Management often use 
cross-sectional methods in which they collect data on a sample of organizations at a single point 
in time.
16 This approach can show which attributes of firms are correlated with the adoption of 
progressive employment programs and which employment programs are correlated with 
workforce diversity. By contrast, longitudinal methods allow researchers to specify the causes of 
program adoption and workforce diversity with much greater reliability. As organizational 
sociologists our approach is resolutely empirical and thus we put more stock in studies using 
longitudinal data. 
Understanding the progressive human resources innovations firms have embraced over 
the last half century is key to understanding social inequality in the U.S. today and the role of the 
law in addressing it.  The current structure of inequality is shaped by characteristics of the labor 
market and by the skills and aspirations of women and men, whites and African-Americans, to 
be sure.  But it is also shaped by corporate human resources policies adopted in reaction to 
antidiscrimination laws, from recruitment and training systems to promotion procedures to 
diversity mentoring and training programs. Research shows that when plaintiffs bring legal 
challenges to workplace discrimination, courts consider these measures as indicative of the 
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15 Most of the studies we discuss use event history analysis to study the diffusion of progressive corporate programs. 
Event history analysis of longitudinal data allows us to track cause in ordered events as they appear along the history 
of the firm. By contrast, when analyzing cross sectional data, we cannot determine whether differences between 
organizations with and without progressive programs are what led adopters to adopt those programs. For example, if 
we see more progressive employment programs among firms with many women in management, we cannot 
conclude that women in management promote the adoption of progressive programs, as the opposite is possible as 
well: there are many women in management because these programs were adopted. For a more complete discussion 
of event history analysis, see generally PAUL D. ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS: REGRESSION FOR 
LONGITUDINAL EVENT DATA (Richard G. Niemi, SAGE Publications, Inc. 1984).  
16  See, e.g., Lois Joy, Nancy M. Carter, Harvey M. Wagner & Sriram Narayanan, The Bottom Line: Corporate 
Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards, CATALYST, 
http://www.catalyst.org/file/139/bottom%20line%202.pdf (2007); Society for Human Resource Management, 
http://www.shrm.org/Research/Articles/Pages/Diversity.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2011). 7	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company’s intent to comply with civil rights laws.
17  The courts need to understand which of 
these measures actually promote equality of opportunity.  
The article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the legal framework for prohibiting 
workplace discrimination. Part II considers what factors lead firms to become progressive actors, 
adopting equal employment and diversity innovations.  Studies show that new government 
regulations and judicial decisions stimulate firms to adopt progressive reforms, particularly 
among firms in the limelight.  Advocacy by human resources professionals helps to spread many 
programs, and as does advocacy by historically disadvantaged groups within management.   
Firms with progressive corporate cultures are also more likely to take these measures.   
In parts III and IV we ask what effects these innovations have had on the share of women 
and minorities in the corporate workforce and in good jobs.  Part III finds that the measures that 
workplaces most commonly use, such as diversity training, diversity performance evaluations, 
and standardized hiring practices and grievance procedures, do not lead to a measurable increase 
in the diversity of a company’s management, perhaps because these measures identify managers 
as the cause of the problem.  Networking programs have also generally proven ineffective, 
except in the case of white women, and we suggest that this is because vertical relationships are 
the key to moving up in the firm.  Part IV argues that measures such as targeted recruitment, 
mentoring programs, and granting authority to diversity managers and diversity taskforces are far 
more effective. These programs are designed to involve managers in problem-solving in a 
positive way.  Perhaps that is the key to their success. Taken together the results suggest that 
engaging managers in diversity efforts has been more effective than blaming managers and 
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17 Lauren B. Edelman, Linda H. Krieger, Scott R. Eliason, Catherine R. Albiston & Virginia Mellema, Am. J. Sociol. 
When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888,  
(2011) (analyzing a sample of federal employment discrimination opinions and finding that “judges increasingly 
defer to organizational structures in their opinions, ultimately inferring non-discrimination from their presence”). 8	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defining them as the source of the problem. Part VI discusses the implication of these findings 
for future research and for the future of progressive corporate action in the realm of workforce 
diversity.  
 
1.  Legal Framework for Prohibiting Workplace Discrimination  
The federal government began to take an active role in regulating workplace discrimination 
in the 1960s, . Before the early 1960s, some states prohibited employment discrimination in 
private corporations on the basis of race, and the federal government prohibited discrimination 
among military contractors.
18  Yet these limited regulations were rarely enforced, and companies 
continued to follow either explicit or unwritten policies for excluding blacks and women from 
the best-paying jobs.
19 
Beginning in the 1960s, the federal government took a series of steps that laid the framework 
for the current prohibitions on workplace discrimination. First, President John F. Kennedy’s 
Executive Order 10,925 in 1961 required federal contractors to take “affirmative action to ensure 
that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard 
to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”
20  In 1965 President Lyndon Johnson’s Executive 
Order 11,246 updated Kennedy’s original order, requiring all federal contractors and 
subcontractors whose contracts exceed $10,000 to undertake affirmative action to improve the 
real position of minorities in the workforce.  The new order extended affirmative action 
requirements to all of the work done by firms with federal contracts, not just contracted work.
21  
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18 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 30, 32 
19 Id. at 27-31. 
20 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. § 301.1 (1961), superseded by Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 
(Sept. 24, 1965). 
21 Need citation to specific provision of executive order. 
Exec. Order No. 11,246. Section 202: Provisions of Paragraphs (1) through (7). 9	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While the original executive order only prohibited discrimination based on race, Johnson 
expanded the order in 1967 to prohibit discrimination based on sex and religion..
22 In response to 
these executive orders, the largest federal contractors, led by military supplier Lockheed, joined 
forces in a private initiative dubbed Plans for Progress, promising to workforce segregation.
23 
In the most significant anti-discrimination step of the 1960s, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 made it illegal for private employers with a qualifying number of employees to 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
24 Kennedy’s executive 
order only covered government contractors, but now a much wider swath of businesses had to 
comply with federal anti-discrimination mandates. In 1967, Congress extended Title VII 
protections to persons between the ages of 40 and 65 and in 1973, it prohibited recipients of 
federal funding from discriminating on the basis of disability.
25 These acts were later reinforced 
by 1986 age discrimination amendments protecting most workers over age 70, and by the 1990 
Americans with Disabilities Act extending protections to disabled workers in private 
enterprises.
26 
Congress also took a series of measures to address the status of women in the workplace. The 
Equal Pay Act of 1963 made it illegal to pay men and women different wages for the same 
work.
27  The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 required employers to treat pregnant women 
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Please see. http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/eo-11246.html  
22 Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967) (amending Exec. Order No. 11,246). 
23 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 72-73. 
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
25 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4(a), 81 Stat. 61, 63 (establishing that 
employers with a qualifying number of employees cannot discriminate on the basis of age) (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 623 (2008)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 501–04, 87 Stat. 355, 390–94 , § 501-
04 (preventing the federal government, federal agencies, programs that receive federal grants, and employers that 
receive federal contracts from discriminating against the disabled). 
26 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9201(b), 100 Stat. 170, 171 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2008)); Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-36, § 102(a), 
104 Stat. 327, 331–32, § 102 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2009)). 
27 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. 88-38, § 3(d)(1), 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2007)); 10	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the same as similarly situated employees “for all employment-related purposes,” though it did 
not require employers to provide maternity leaves.
28 In 1993 the Family and Medical Leave Act 
required employers to guarantee the jobs of workers who took up to 12 weeks of medical, 
parental, or family leave.
29 As Congress took these steps to improve the job prospects of working 
mothers, the courts also played a role in expanding protections for women by construing Title 
VII to outlaw sexual harassment by employers.
30   
While this series of executive orders and laws brought broad categories of American workers 
under anti-discrimination protections, these measures initially had only a limited practical effect 
because of weak federal enforcement. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act created the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to enforce the law.
31 Johnson’s executive order 
created what is now the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) to enforce 
affirmative action law for federal contractors.
32 Yet the enforcement agencies had only limited 
powers, and the laws did not make clear what constituted prohibited discrimination. Neither 
Kennedy nor Johnson defined “affirmative action” in their orders to federal contractors, and 
neither established practical guidelines. Likewise, Title VII made discrimination illegal but did 
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see generally Barbara M. Boyle, Equal Opportunity for Women is Smart Business, 51 HARVARD BUS. REV. 85, 86 
(1973); ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM   P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS, MARKETS AND 
UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA 26-27 (1999). 
28 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994). 
29 Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006). 
30 See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (“[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of 
Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”); DOBBIN, 
supra note 2, at 190-219. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006). For background on the causes and effects of equal employment opportunity 
legislation, see PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL (1985). 
32 Bernard E. Anderson, The Ebb and Flow of Enforcing Executive Order 11246, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 298, 299 
(1996). 11	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not define it. During the 1960s, the ambiguity of these laws caused only modest concern among 
employers because sanctions were rare.
33 
The regulatory environment changed broadly in the early 1970s, stimulating many firms to 
take equal opportunity more seriously. In 1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power, the Supreme Court 
construed Title VII to extend to employer practices that were not explicitly discriminatory but 
which had a “disparate impact” on women or minorities.
34 In 1972 Congress expanded the 
coverage of Title VII and for the first time gave the EEOC the authority to sue employers.
35  In 
December 1971 the OFCCP set out specific affirmative action guidelines for federal contractors, 
calling for affirmative action plans with numerical goals and timetables for minority and female 
employees and with mechanisms for evaluating program effectiveness.
36  The OFCCP soon 
stepped up compliance reviews for federal contractors.
37 
 In the 1980s the legal environment changed again.	 ﾠThe Reagan Administration put the 
brakes on civil rights enforcement as part of its broader efforts to reduce government regulation 
of business.
38 Enforcement of affirmative action policies against federal contractors virtually 
halted.
39 With the OFCCP’s staffing cut in half, the agency significantly reduced compliance 
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33 See Id. at 299 (noting that “the contracting agencies varied widely” in the amount of resources devoted to 
enforcing the executive orders); Dobbin, supra note 2, at 34-38 (discussing the ambiguity of Title VII and the 
weakness of the EEOC). 
34 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
35 Equal Employment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sections 
2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)); see also JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, 
CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 126 (1996). 
36. 41 CFR 60-2.(especially  41 CFR60–2.10  through 41 CFR60–2.17) 
Please see the following  http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr&sid=d1c45e75d9268b116419e9d3501cee81&rgn=div5&view=text&node=41:1.2.3.1.2&idno=41#41:1.2.3.1.2.1 
37 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 75-79; Jonathan S. Leonard, What Promises are Worth: The Impact of Affirmative Action 
Goals.  20 J. Hum. Resou. 3-20 (1985); ANDERSON, supra note 29, at 298 299. 
41 CFR 60-1.20 
Please see http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div5&view=text&node=41:1.2.3.1.1&idno=41 
38 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 133-36 
39 See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 
97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1541 (1992) (citing a congressional committee report that “effective enforcement [of 
Executive Order 11,246] has come to a virtual standstill” since 1980). 12	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reviews of federal contractors and lifted sanctions of all sorts.
40 During President Carter’s single 
term in office, the OFCCP had on thirteen occasions imposed a bar on future federal contracts, 
its most drastic sanction for noncompliance, but the agency only used this sanction four times 
during Reagan’s first term in office.
41 Conciliation agreements were set up for 49 percent of 
violators in 1980 but only 33 percent in 1985.
42 The government also dramatically reduced its 
oversight of private corporations as it cut EEOC funding and staffing.
43 The EEOC sponsored 
fewer conciliation agreements and delayed decisions about pending cases.
44 The step-down of 
federal enforcement during the Reagan administration would persist through subsequent 
administrations.
45  
Since the dawn of the Civil Rights Era, compliance norms have been worked out between 
corporations and the courts, for the most part.  The OFCCP promoted certain standards, which 
they derived from the behavior of the leading firms involved in the voluntary Plans for Progress 
program developed by federal contractors in the 1960s.  The courts backed certain voluntary 
standards that were developed in corporations.  Compliance strategies, then, were in Lauren 
Edelman’s terms “endogenous,” in that they were developed by regulated businesses rather than 
imposed by government regulators.
46 The fact that compliance standards were developed by 
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40 Virginia duRivage, The OFCCP Under the Reagan Administration: Affirmative Action in Retreat, 36  LAB. LAW J. 
360, 364 (1985) (stating that budget cuts reduced OFCCP staffing by 52 percent and led to a drop in compliance 
reviews). 
41 Id.  Anderson, Bernard E The ebb and flow of enforcing Executive Order 11246 
The American Economic Review; May 1996; 86, 2; pg. 298. At 300. 
42 Anderson, supra note 29, at 300. 
43 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 137; see also J. Ronald Fox, Breaking the Regulatory Deadlock, 59 HARV. BUS. REV. 97 
(1981) (calling for partnerships between business and government regulators to improve efficiency and reduce 
conflict); Caroline E. Mayer, U.S. Relaxing Enforcement of Regulations, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1981, at  F1 
(discussing the Reagan administration’s budget cuts across federal regulatory agencies). 
44 ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY  270 (1993). 
45 See Jonathan  S. Leonard, Women and Affirmative Action, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 73-74  (1989) (“An 
administration lacking the will to enforce affirmative action beyond rubber-stamped compliance reviews has 
resulted in an affirmative action program without practical effect since 1980.”). 
46 Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance 13	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
industry rather than by government meant that they would change considerably over time, as 
personnel experts devised new practices in response to changing public perceptions of the causes 
of inequality.  But it also meant that firms experimented with a variety of different measures, 
some of them were based on available personnel tools. If all firms had adopted a single set of 
programs in response to a clear legal mandate, it might have been difficult to assess their effect. 
The variation in adoption allows us to examine what affected adoption of compliance measures 
and which measures were effective by comparing firms.   
2.  Factors that Make Firms Behave Progressively  
Ambiguous laws and fluctuating enforcement effected sustained changes in corporate human 
resources policies. These effects came about in multiple ways. Early research pointed to three 
driving forces behind corporate adoption of progressive equal opportunity and diversity 
structures: regulatory pressures, corporate visibility, and advocacy by human resources 
professionals and by identity groups.  Since the early 1980s, research suggests, regulation has 
played less of a role. Instead, recent studies have highlighted advocacy from internal groups, as 
well as cultural norms at the industry and firm level, as drivers of innovation.  Firms that have 
already made a commitment to progressive employment policies and those that are in industries 
where diversity measures are common continue to install new diversity measures even in the 
absence of congressional and judicial headlines. Adoption of new diversity innovations became 
highly path dependent.  Firms in less progressive industries, and those that do not have 
progressive histories, are less likely to join the bandwagon.  
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Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 407 (1999) (“That organizations are both responding to and 
constructing the law that regulates them renders the law ‘endogenous’; the content and meaning of law is determined 
within the social field that it is designed to regulate.”). 14	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2.1.  Regulatory Pressure   
Organizational scholars have pointed to the role of legal standards and the social norms they 
create in promoting progressive corporate behavior.
47  Studies show that new federal regulations 
and judicial decisions that expand the scope of anti-discrimination law typically increase the 
likelihood that firms will adopt equal opportunity and diversity innovations.
48   
   Affirmative Action Regulations and Equal Opportunity Legislation.  Direct 
government regulation has been shown to lead to more progressive policies. In particular, 
affirmative action regulations and equal opportunity laws have been the two main sources of 
legal pressure shaping corporate employment practices. For example, Kennedy’s Executive 
Order in 1961 required government contractors to “take affirmative action to ensure that 
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to 
their race.”
49 In response to the order, contractors soon wrote non-discrimination policies of their 
own, changed their personnel manuals, and announced in job advertisements that they were 
“Equal Opportunity Employers.”
50  Studies have shown that federal contractors were more likely 
than similar firms without contracts to implement a number of progressive employment policies, 
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47 See Frank Dobbin, John R. Sutton, John W. Meyer & Richard Scott, Equal Opportunity Law and the Construction 
of Internal Labor Markets, 99 AM. J. SOC. 396, 397 (1993) (discussing the influence of federal Equal Opportunity 
Law on progressive promotion practices); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Iinstitutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150 (1983) 
(noting situations in which “organizational change is a direct response to government mandate,” including the hiring 
of affirmative action managers); cf. John W. Meyer, The Effects of Education as an Institution, 83 AM. J. SOC. 55, 65 
(1977) (citing the role of the law in shaping organizational practice in educational systems). 
48 See Edelman, supra note 36, at 1535 (“Organizations that are sensitive to their legal environments develop forms 
of governance that conform to legal norms in order to achieve legitimacy.”); Edelman, supra note 6, at 1402 
(crediting “law and the legal environment” for the expansion of due process in the workplace); John  R. Sutton & 
Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in American Firms, 1955-1985, 61 
AM. SOC. REV. 794, 795(1996) (citing studies showing that the rate of adoption of due process governance practices 
rose during periods of increased federal enforcement of equal opportunity laws). 
49 Executive Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1975, 1977 (1961). 
50. See, e.g., Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Advertisement, Buy You a New Sports Car?, THE TECH, Oct. 
13, 1965, at 15, available at http://tech.mit.edu/archives/VOL_085/TECH_V085_S0279_P015.pdf (declaring the 
company to be an “Equal Opportunity Employer”). 15	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including formal equal opportunity policies, corporate compliance offices, and due process 
procedures.
51   
Equal opportunity legislation prohibited discrimination but it neither defined the meaning 
of discrimination nor provided clear compliance guidelines; moreover Congress decided not to 
create a regulatory agency with independent authority to set compliance standards.
52 The 
ambiguity of regulation and rapid changes in enforcement stimulated “endogenous” compliance 
processes
53, wherein many executives hired full-time equal opportunity experts, or created new 
departments, to track changes in the law and in judicial interpretation.
54  These new experts came 
mostly from the personnel profession, and they filled in the gaps left by the federal statute.  
Across they decades they introduced many implements from their professional arsenal, from 
grievance procedures to bureaucratic hiring and promotion systems, and argued that these 
reforms would demonstrate civil rights compliance to the courts.
55  While these changes came 
about after the enactment of Title VII, in other cases corporations have adopted progressive 
practices in anticipation of new laws. Kelly and Dobbin show that even before the Family and 
Medical Leave Act was enacted in 1993, to require corporations to offer maternity leaves, many 
firms had created maternity leave programs in response to signals from Congress that a change 
was afoot.
56  
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51 See Edelman, supra note 36, at 1562 (finding that after the enactment of Title VII, firms with “contractual or 
administrative linkages to the federal government” were almost three times more likely to create equal employment 
opportunity/affirmative action offices); Frank Dobbin, Soohan Kim & Alexandra Kalev, You Can’t Always Get 
What You Need: Organizational Determinants of Diversity Programs 76 Am. Sociol. Rev. 386, 389 (1993) (noting 
that “the very first equal opportunity programs were devised by big military contractors in the South”); SUTTON & 
DOBBIN, supra note 47, at 806 (finding that between 1981 and 1985, firms with federal contracts were more likely to 
adopt grievance procedures).   
52 See ANTHONY S. CHEN, THE FIFTH FREEDOM: JOBS, POLITICS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1941-72 
16  (2009) (arguing that Title VII limited the effectiveness of the EEOC by “giving it only a sliver of jurisdiction 
over job discrimination and leaving it without any independent authority to enforce the law.”). 
53 EDELMAN, UGGEN & ERLANGER, supra note 43, at 407. 
54  DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 75. 
55 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 75-77. 
56 Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, Civil Rights Law at Work: Sex Discrimination and the Rise of Maternity Leave 16	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Judicial and Administrative Enforcement.  Rulings by local, state, and federal judges 
and bureaucrats also induced firms to embrace a number of different progressive employment 
programs.   Employers responded with a range of bureaucratic procedures designed to put an end 
to managerial bias in hiring and promotion.
57 Some studies show that discrimination lawsuits and 
federal affirmative action compliance reviews stimulate employers to adopt progressive 
employment programs.
58  Others show that progressive court rulings stimulate adoption. For 
example, Dobbin and Kelly show that judicial rulings in the 1970s in favor of sexual harassment 
plaintiffs caused firms to adopt grievance procedures.
59  Firms located in jurisdictions where the 
courts have historically taken a harder line on equal employment opportunity cases face 
additional pressure to comply with the law. Guthrie and Roth find that in federal circuit court 
districts where judges are more likely to favor plaintiffs in discrimination suits, firms are more 
likely to install work-family programs designed to attract and retain female employees.
60   
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Policies, 105 Am. J. Sociol. 455, 456 (1999). 
57 See DOBBIN, SUTTON, MEYER & SCOTT, supra note 46, at 419 (discussing the effect of legal changes on the 
adoption of job descriptions, performance evaluations, and salary classification systems). 
58 Cf. Lauren B. Edelman, Steven E. Abraham & Howard S. Erlanger, Professional Construction of the Law:  The 
Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 Law and Society Review 47, 79 (1992) (discussing how employers have 
changed their practices in response to court rulings on wrongful discharge). 
59 Frank Dobbin & Erin  L. Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: The Professional Construction of Legal Compliance in 
Organizations, 112 Am. J. Sociol. 1208, 1230 (2007) (“Each time a legal landmark appeared to raise organizational 
risk, more executives followed personnel’s prescription of grievance procedures.”); see also DOBBIN, supra note 2, 
at 197. Influential cases include Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that retaliatory action 
against a female employee who declines a male supervisor’s sexual advances constitutes sex discrimination under 
Title VII); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d  983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that abolishing a female employee’s job 
because she refused a male supervisor’s sexual advances violates Title VII as amended by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972); Tomkins v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Tomkins II), 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 
1977) (finding a cause of action under Title VII when a female employee’s continued employment was conditioned 
on submitting to the sexual advances of a male supervisor). 
60 Doug Guthrie & Louise Marie Roth, The State, Courts, and Maternity Policies in U.S. Organizations:  Specifying 
Institutional Mechanisms, 64 Am. Sociol. Rev. 41, 54-55 (1999) (finding that an organization is about 20 percent 
more likely to offer a maternity leave policy if it is located in the Second or Third Circuits, which have taken 
“considerably more liberal or progressive positions on equal employment opportunity, relative to other circuit court 
jurisdictions”). 17	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2.2.  Organizational Visibility  
Studies find that firms are susceptible to indirect effects of regulatory pressure as well as to 
direct effects.  Firms subject to scrutiny from the public and from regulators due to their 
proximity to the public sphere, or their sheer size, are more likely to embrace progressive 
employment programs.   
Proximity to the public sphere.  Firms that are closer to the public sector are more 
susceptible to normative pressures regarding fair and inclusive employment practices. On a 
continuum of private to public sector employers, then, various studies have suggested that 
government agencies are more likely than private sector firms to embrace progressive 
employment programs, and that in the private sector, nonprofits, regulated utilities, and 
consumer product firms are more likely than other employers.
61 As Edelman argues, proximity to 
the public sector makes firms more sensitive to the legal environment.
62  Proximity to the public 
sphere puts firms in contact with the civil service system, where bureaucratic procedures to 
ensure fairness and rights are “highly institutionalized,” and it also makes firms more visible and 
open to public scrutiny.
63  Edelman finds that federal and state agencies as well as universities 
and colleges are significantly more likely to establish equal employment opportunity offices.
64 In 
an analysis of cross-sectional data from 1991, Ingram and Simons confirm that public-sector 
employers are more likely to offer work/family benefits, including leaves, dependent care 
assistance, and flexible work schedules.
65  Kelly shows that companies close to the public sector 
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61 FRANK DOBBIN, LAUREN B. EDELMAN, JOHN W. MEYER, W. RICHARD SCOTT & ANN SWIDLER, The Expansion of 
Due Process in Organizations, in INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS AND ORGANIZATIONS: CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT, 
(LYNNE G. ZUCKER ed., 1988), at 82-86 (finding that the more closely a firm is linked to the public sphere, the more 
likely it is to adopt due process protections for employees); EDELMAN, supra note 29, at 1428.  
62 EDELMAN, supra note 36, at 1548. 
63 Id. at 1549.  
64 Id. at 1562.  
65  Paul Ingram & Tal Simons, Institutional and Resource Dependence Determinants of Responsiveness to Work-
Family Issues, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1466, 1476 (1995). 18	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are quicker to adopt work-family programs in response to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993.
 66  
  Size.  Organizational scholars have long argued that large organizations are most likely to 
create formal policies to govern the employment relationship.
67 Edelman suggests that large 
organizations are more responsive to their legal environment in part to avoid negative publicity 
from legal action, since they are more frequently targeted by enforcement agencies and are more 
susceptible to scrutiny from the public at large.
68 Thus, studies find that large organizations more 
often create formal bureaucratic systems to manage compliance with affirmative action and equal 
opportunity.
69  
Taken together studies show that legal regulation can play a role in prompting 
corporations to adopt progressive measures, especially for firms that are large or close to the 
public sector. Yet studies show that after the Reagan administration decreased regulatory 
pressure in the 1980s, the law became less of a significant factor in the adoption of progressive 
equal opportunity offices and policies.
70 Instead, pressure from advocacy groups and from 
corporate culture began to play a larger role.   
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66 Erin  L. Kelly, Failure to Update: An Institutuional Perspective on Noncompliance with the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 44 Law. Soc. Rev. 33, 49, 50 (2010). 
67 See Peter M. Blau, A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations, 35 AM. SOC. REV. 201, 204-207 (1970) 
(noting the generalization that “increasing size generates structural differentiation among organizations,” which in 
turn gives rise to a “need for coordination”). 
68 Edelman, supra note 39, at 1549. 
69 See John  R. Sutton, Frank Dobbin, John W. Meyer & W. Richard Scott, The Legalization of the Workplace, 99 
AM. J. SOC. 944, 963 (1994) (finding a relationship between size and the adoption rate of grievance procedures);  
Barbara F. Reskin & Debra Branch McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations' Employment of Male and Female 
Managers, 65 Am. Sociol. Rev. 210, 222-23 (2000) (discussing the connection between size and the formalization 
of personnel practices);  Alison M. Konrad & Frank. Linnehan, Formalized HRM Structures - Coordinating Equal-
Employment Opportunity or Concealing Organizational Practices, 38 Acad. Manage. J. 787, 805 (1995) (finding an 
association between size and formalized human resources management structures). 
70  See EDELMAN, supra note 36, at 1534 (“While accounts that focus on law and the regulatory process find them 
seriously flawed, studies of work-force demographics show improvements in the economic and occupational status 
of minorities and women, albeit not necessarily in response to the law.”); DOBBIN, KIM & KALEV, supra note 50, at 
389-90 (evidence shows that regulatory pressure led firms to adopt diversity programs in the 1970s, when regulation 
was more active, but it is no longer a “prime cause” of adoption); Erin L. Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative 
Action Became Diversity Management?: Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961-1996, 41 Am. Behav. 19	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2.3.  Advocacy Groups 
Advocacy groups within the firm promote progressive employment policies, with human 
resources and diversity experts leading the charge.  Research suggests, moreover, that as women 
began to enter management jobs, they successfully advocated for a number of progressive 
employment programs.   
Human resources professionals.  Personnel officials, equal opportunity consultants, and 
diversity experts have promoted one round of equal opportunity and diversity programs after 
another. In the 1960s, they wrote non-discrimination policies based on union contract clauses 
designed to prevent discrimination against union leaders, and they developed new recruitment 
programs and skills and management training systems to bring in more women and minorities 
and prepare them for advancement.
71   In the 1970s, as the personnel profession more than 
doubled in size and as the proportion of women in the profession rose from a third to nearly a 
half, personnel experts created formal hiring and promotion systems designed to deny managers 
the chance to exercise bias.
72 Human resources experts promoted the view that equal opportunity 
programs could offer the firm strategic advantages.  As Uniroyal Tire’s president argued in 1970, 
“In the decades ahead any organization which ignores or underestimates the potential of 
women—or overlooks any source of talent for that matter—will be making a fatal mistake.”
73  
Beginning in the 1980s, personnel experts used a similar rhetoric in response to the Reagan 
administration’s efforts to put an end to affirmative action and equal opportunity enforcement. 
They rebranded the programs they had built for legal compliance as part of the new “diversity 
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Sci. 960, 971 (1998) (noting that employers “curtailed their most proactive affirmative action measures” during the 
cutback in federal enforcement in the 1980s). 
71 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 42.  
72 Id. at 168-69, 224-26. 
73 Boyle, supra note 25, at 95. 20	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management” initiative, designed to ensure that each employee could “make maximum use of his 
or her talents” and that companies could better serve a diverse client base.
74 Studies show that 
from the 1980s, when the pressure from regulators declined, personnel experts stepped up 
pressure on firms to adopt diversity programs under the banner of managerial effectiveness.
75  
This pressure leads to results; studies show that firms that rely on professionals to design their 
human resources policies are most likely to install the latest diversity innovations.
76  
Identity groups in the workforce.  Organizational sociologists have long argued that 
managers choose practices that appeal to demographic groups within the firm, so as to win their 
cooperation and hard work.
77  This idea comes resource dependency theorists, who argue that 
organizations must acquire critical resources from their environments as well as from their 
internal constituencies. Corporate behavior may therefore be designed to satisfy unions, age 
cohorts, racial groups, and others within the firm.  Departments to manage labor relations and 
affirmative action were created to absorb employee protests, such that workers with union-
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74 Statement of Wayne E. Hedien, Chairman, Allstate Insurance Company, at 1991 symposium, reprinted in 
CONFERENCE BOARD, In Diversity Is Strength: Capitalizing on the New Work Force. 75th Anniversary Symposia 
Series. Report Number 994. at 11-12 (Judith Alster, et al. eds., Conference Board, Inc. 1992). 
75 See Lauren B. Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller, Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of the 
Law, 106 Am. J. Sociol. 1589, 1611-12 (2001) (arguing that personnel managers adopted a new rhetoric of 
“managing diversity” to replace the previous focus on compliance with the law); KELLY & DOBBIN, supra note 69, 
at 961-62 (finding that after the cutback in federal enforcement, personnel managers “downplayed legal compliance 
and emphasized first the goal of rationalizing human resources and later the goal of increasing profits by expanding 
diversity in the workforce and customer base.”). 
76 See Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 55, at 484 (noting that having a benefits manager makes companies more likely 
to adopt maternity leave policies) ; Edelman, Abraham & Erlanger, supra note 57, at 50 (discussing studies on the 
role of personnel professionals in leading firms to adopt bureaucratic promotion practices, due process protections, 
and equal employment opportunity structures); Dobbin &  Kelly, supra note 58, at 1230 (“Organizations that looked 
to HR professionals for advice were significantly more likely to adopt sexual harassment procedures and training.”); 
Frank  Dobbin & John R. Sutton, The Strength of a Weak State: The Rights Revolution and the Rise of Human 
Resources Management Divisions, 104 Am. J. Sociol. 441, 467 (1998) (finding that personnel managers’ 
associations supported the creation of new positions to oversee equal employment opportunity programs). 
77 See JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE 
DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 24-25 (1978) (describing the need for an organization to maintain “a coalition large 
enough to ensure survival”). 21	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related concerns can “appeal to the personnel or industrial relations department, while minorities 
can articulate their interests through affirmative action offices”
78  
 Applied to corporate employment policies, resource dependency theory suggests that 
firms will embrace progressive policies only after they have achieved significant workforce, and 
especially management, diversity, as executives will try to win the hearts and minds of female 
and minority workers.  In support of this argument, studies have shown that women and 
minorities are more supportive of diversity programs.  Bobo and Kluegel find that blacks are 
significantly more supportive than whites of opportunity enhancement policies targeting 
blacks.
79  Cohen and Huffman report that in the 1996 General Social Survey, employed women 
were 1.2 times as likely as men to agree that “employers should make special efforts to hire and 
promote qualified women” to remedy past discrimination, and women managers were 1.3 times 
as likely to agree as men.
80  In reviewing decades of research on support for affirmative action 
programs, Steeh and Krysan show that blacks are consistently more supportive of government 
aid for minorities and hiring preferences.
81      
Recent research suggests that diversity in the workforce at large does not promote the 
adoption of progressive employment policies.
82  However, diversity in the management ranks 
does promote adoption.  In particular, as the proportion of white women in management 
increases, firms are more likely to adopt four equal opportunity and diversity measures: equal 
opportunity advertisements, diversity training for managers, diversity training for the entire 
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78 (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 273).   
79 Lawrence Bobo & James R. Kluegel, Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest Stratification Ideology or 
Racial Attitudes?, 58 Am. Sociol. Rev. 443, 449 (1993). 
80 Philip N. Cohen & Matt L. Huffman, Working for the Woman? Female Managers and the Gender Wage Gap, 72 
Am. Sociol. Rev. 681, 682 (2007).  
81 Charlotte Steeh & Maria Krysan, The Polls - Trends: Affirmative Action and the Public 1970-1995, 60 Public. 
Opin. Quart. 128, 135-37 (1996). 
82  Dobbin, Kim & Kalev, supra note 50, at 395 (concluding there are “almost no effects of workforce diversity…on 
adoption of diversity programs”). 22	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workforce, and diversity taskforces.
83  This suggests that identity groups successfully lobby for 
progressive social policies only when they win representation in powerful positions within a firm 
and that white women have better leverage than non-whites.
84 
Feminization among human resources professionals.   As women won a greater role in human 
resource management, they used these positions to successfully advocate for a number of 
progressive employment programs.	 ﾠThe new civil rights focus in personnel departments fueled 
the feminization of the field.  The personnel field itself grew tenfold between 1960 and 2000 
while the labor force only doubled.
85 Women were nearly unknown in the field as of 1960, but 
they held half of specialist and manager jobs by 1980, and 70 percent of jobs by the late 1990s.
86 
This change in the profession’s composition shaped its agenda. In the early 1970s, federal law 
did not require employers to offer maternity leave policies that guaranteed that women could 
return to their jobs after childbirth, but personnel offices began to institute such policies between 
1972 and 1975.
87 According to one study, fewer than a quarter of companies reported that they 
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83 Id. at 400-01. 
84 Cf. Tai-Young Kim, Dongyoub Shin, Hongseok Oh & Young-Chul Jeong, Inside the Iron Cage: Organizational 
Political Dynamics and Institutional Changes in Presidential Selection Systems in Korean Universities, 1985–2002, 
52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 286, 316 (2007) (arguing that “the power of organized challengers who advocate a new 
institutional model in an organization is an important factor in explaining variations in organizational responses to 
pressures for institutional change”); David Strang & Dong-Il Jung, Organizational Change as an Orchestrated 
Social Movement: Recruitment to a Corporate Quality Initiative, in Social Movements and Organization Theory at 
280, 307-09 (Gerald F. Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott & Mayen N. Zald, eds., 2005) (proposing that “a 
social movement framework has utility for understanding mobilizing efforts inside as well as across organizations” 
and that the success of a social movement depends on actors at all levels of the corporate structure, not just CEOs); 
Timothy J. Vogus & Gerald F. Davis, Elite Mobilization for Antitakeover Legislation, 1982-1990, SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 96, 119 (Gerald F. Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott & Mayer N. 
Zald, eds., 2005) ( “It is when changes in incentives…are collectively interpreted as a cause of action by a well-
organized set of actors that significant movements arise. Thus, the better organized the local corporate elite…, the 
faster the state legislature was to adopt management-friendly legislation regulating hostile takeovers.”).  
85 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 5. 
86 Id. at 169; see also Patricia Roos & Joan  E. Manley, Staffing Personnel: Feminization and Change in Human 
Resource Management, 99 Sociol. Focus. 245, 248 (1996).  
87 BNA (Bureau of National Affairs), Paid Leave and Leave of Absence Policies. No. 111, pt. (1975).  
“Paid Leave and Leave of Absence Policies.” Personnel Policies Forum, Survey No. 111. Washington, D.C.: BNA (1975).	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had job-protected maternity leave in 1969, but this number nearly tripled by 1978.
88 Five states 
outlawed pregnancy discrimination between 1972 and 1981, but even where pregnancy 
discrimination was not outlawed, personnel managers created maternity leave policies.
89   
 
2.4   Corporate and Industry Cultures  
Studies show that both internal and external cultures shape corporate human resources policies. 
Firms with a progressive founding team, a legalistic culture, or a history of attentiveness to new 
societal norms are more likely to implement progressive programs, as are firms in progressive 
industries.   
Corporate culture.  Research shows that corporate culture shapes decisions about 
program innovations.  The preferences of founders become institutionalized in corporate 
structure and culture and serve as a robust predictor of future corporate behavior.
90  In a study of 
young technology start-ups in California, James Baron and his colleagues located and 
interviewed members of the founding teams about six years after founding. They learned that 
founders’ original ideas about employment relations in their firms had lasting effects.
91 When the 
founder had a clear bureaucratic vision of selecting employees based on skills needed to 
accomplish specific tasks (as opposed to selection based on long-term potential or fit with the 
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90 See James N. Baron, Michael T. Hannan & M. Diane Burton, Labor Pains: Change in Organizational Models and 
Employee Turnover in Young, High-Tech Firms, 106 Am. J. Sociol. 960, 1012 (2001) (discussing research showing 
that “founders’ initial organizational blueprints shaped not only the evolution of human resource practices and the 
HR function, but numerous other facets of organizational evolution as well.”); James N. Baron, Michael T. Hannan 
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Organizations, 64 Am. Sociol. Rev. 527, 528 (1999) [hereinafter Baron, Building the Iron Cage] (arguing that 
founding conditions have “an indelible and enduring influence on how enterprises evolve”).  
91 Baron, Building the Iron Cage, supra n. 89, at 543.  24	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
organizational culture, for example), the firm grew to be more heavily bureaucratic than 
otherwise similar firms, even if the founders had left the firm.
92 The gender mix of the workforce 
in the early days had a lasting effect as well, and firms with fewer women became more 
bureaucratic.
93     
Many firms have embraced the wider societal culture of legalism, whereby interactions 
are guided by law-like principles and ideals, formal corporate structures and procedures are 
modeled on the state, and individual employees are viewed as rights-bearing.
94 Sutton, Dobbin, 
Meyer and Scott find variation in corporate cultures of legalism, such that employers with an 
orientation to legalistic rules and practices are more likely to take up both rights-enhancing and 
rights-limiting personnel rules.
95 Kelly and Kalev find that employers create law-like principles 
for handling flexible work arrangements such as flextime, telecommuting, and job-sharing, even 
though there are no laws mandating these benefits and even where managers retain discretionary 
authority over their use.
96 In a recent study of the diffusion of six diversity programs, Dobbin, 
Kim and Kalev find that firms with a history of formalizing employment rights and rules were 
significantly more likely to adopt formal pro-diversity programs: equal opportunity 
advertisements, diversity training, diversity taskforces, and mentoring programs.
97  
Industry culture.  A firm’s use of progressive employment practices is also affected by 
its peers.  Research shows that managers feel pressure to succumb to popular management trends 
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94 See SUTTON & DOBBIN, supra note 48, at 794 (discussing a rise in the use of law-like procedures to solve 
workplace disputes, which “implies a qualitatively new image of the worker as a self-actualizing, career-oriented, 
rights-bearing individual”); see generally PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: 
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95Id. at 794 
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of all sorts.
98  Tolbert and Zucker find that municipal civil service reforms began to spread 
broadly between 1880 and 1930 after becoming popular in large cities.
99 Several other studies 
similarly show that innovations spread quickly within susceptible sectors.
100  The adoption of 
progressive employment programs reflects this broader trend: norms in the field are highly 
influential.
101 A recent study shows that the proportion of industry members with diversity 
training, diversity taskforces, diversity performance evaluations, and mentoring programs 
predicts adoptions by other industry members.
102  
Taken together, extant research points to a shift in what drives corporate adoption of 
progressive practices. While early studies pointed to the roles of regulation, public visibility, and 
advocacy from human resources managers in popularizing equal opportunity and diversity 
programs, more recent studies have highlighted the roles of identity group advocates, corporate 
culture, and sectoral cultures in promoting these programs.  Almost regardless of the law, a firm 
may be rendered susceptible to adopting progressive policies due to its location in an industry 
that favors such policies, its history of progressive programs, and its past success in appointing 
women to management.  The flip side of this pattern is that firms that are not located in a 
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The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 1880-1935, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 22, 30, 35 (1983) (finding support for the 
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progressive industries and do not have a history of adopting progressive policies or appointing 
women to management will be less likely to adopt progressive policies and programs in the 
future as well. 
We now turn to the popularity, and efficacy, of specific programs that firms have adopted 
over the decades in pursuit of equality of opportunity. We discuss a range of different programs, 
and review the social science literature on their utility as instruments for raising the proportion of 
women and minorities in the workforce.  We begin with policies that have not proven effective at 
increasing race and gender equality at work, and then turn to programs that social science 
research has found to be effective. The main lessons to be drawn from this section are, first, that 
programs that define managers as part of the problem, rather than part of the solution, have not 
been followed by increases in actual diversity of the workforce.  Second, members of 
disadvantaged groups do not benefit much from ties to other disadvantaged workers, through 
network programs, but do benefit from ties to more powerful managers, through mentoring.   
 
3.  Progressive Programs that Have Failed to Increase Workforce Diversity   
Corporations have adopted a wide range of innovations under the banner of equality of 
opportunity that have not proven to increase workforce diversity.  Studies published to date 
suggest that many of the most popular progressive innovations in the area of equal opportunity, 
including bureaucratic hiring and promotion procedures, grievance procedures, diversity and 
anti-harassment training, and networking programs, have not helped to open doors for women 
and minorities.  Given their popularity, it is important to understand why these programs are not 
helping to foster change.  We review each broad category of programs in turn, and discuss what 
is known about its effects.   27	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3.1.  Bureaucratic Hiring and Promotion Procedures to Prevent Bias 
Since the early 1970s, equal opportunity experts have advocated bureaucratic hiring and 
promotion procedures that would level the playing field by preventing managerial cronyism and 
bias from tainting the appointment process.
103  Common to these procedures is standardization, 
wherein all job applicants and current employees are treated according to the same rules.  Formal 
job posting systems are expected to ensure that promotion opportunities are known to all current 
employees.  Job descriptions are supposed to guarantee that supervisors use consistent criteria to 
select workers.  Salary classification systems are designed to standardize wages across similar 
jobs in different departments and eliminate gender and racial bias in wage-setting.  Annual 
performance reviews are to ensure that raises, promotions, and discipline are based on objective 
performance, not the whimsy of managers.   While these practices have been adopted by many 
companies, research finds they are not particularly effective in increasing workforce diversity.   
Many of these standardized hiring and promotion practices first became popular in the 
union context, and personnel managers then adopted them to solve concerns about discrimination.  
Early in the 1970s, executives began to hear concerns about minorities facing a distinct set of 
barriers for mobility at work.
104  Unions had long demanded formal job posting systems to 
prevent managers from blackballing unionists.
105  Equal opportunity experts proposed job 
posting systems based on the union model, as well as written job descriptions that specified 
prerequisites. The EEOC and judges responded favorably to these practices as means of 
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preventing cronyism.
106 In order to check wage setting based on the gender or race of job-holders 
rather than on job requirements, personnel experts recommended union-inspired salary 
classification systems, which established skill, education, and experience requirements that 
allowed managers to place similar jobs into wage bands.
107    
Equal opportunity experts also argued that a written annual performance evaluation, with 
objective output measures, could fight prejudice.
108  A 1974 article in Personnel suggested: 
“Performance reviews should … be based on solid criteria available to all concerned parties,” to 
ensure promotion decisions based on ability which, “coincidentally” conforms to the EEOC’s 
guidelines.
109  In their 1967 study the Bureau of National Affairs found that companies were 
creating performance evaluations to prevent discrimination.
110    
These standardized hiring procedures became widely popular after the 1980s as measures 
to stem bias and promote equality of opportunity.  According to a 2002 national survey, job 
posting spread from 20 percent of middling and large corporations in 1971, to 90 percent by 
2002.
111 Among the medium sized and large employers in a 1986 survey, the use of job 
descriptions rose from 22 percent in 1956 to 80 percent by 1985, and the use of classification 
systems rose from 23 percent to 70 percent over the same period.
112  Between 1956 and 1966, the 
prevalence of performance evaluations in the sample rose only from 20 percent to 35, and by 
1986, 80 percent of employers had installed them, showing a dramatic growth in their 
popularity.
113   
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Evidence on the effectiveness of these procedures is thin, but it is not promising.  There is 
some positive evidence.  Reskin and McBrier find that large employers with formal personnel 
procedures have more women in management, 
114Baron, Hannan, Hsu, and Koçak find that 
Silicon Valley technology firms founded with bureaucratic personnel systems have made more 
progress in hiring female workers.
115 Elvira and Zatzick find that minorities may be less 
vulnerable to layoffs when personnel decisions are bureaucratized.
116 Dencker finds that firms 
that base their personnel decisions on formal performance evaluations, rather than seniority, 
promote more women during restructuring.
 117   
Yet most of the evidence suggests that bureaucratic procedures have neutral, or even 
negative, effects on workplace diversity.  Studies by Edelman and Petterson, Konrad and 
Linnehan, and Huffman and Velasco find that formal personnel systems are not associated with 
increases in workforce diversity.
118  A number of studies have identified mechanisms through 
which bureaucratic practices may thwart equality of opportunity. For example, job posting 
systems require managers to notify existing workers of open jobs.  But Pager, Western, and 
Bonikowski show that managers make biased hiring decisions when sorting comparable 
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applicants of different races who respond to job advertisements.
119  Thus while bureaucratic 
systems may ensure that jobs are posted, they do not ensure that managers give full consideration 
to applicants from historically disadvantaged groups. Job descriptions have also been linked to 
the slow career advancement of women and minorities. Job descriptions induce the formation of 
narrow job titles, which can leave women and minorities in marginalized jobs with limited 
opportunities for advancement and training.
120  The proliferation of narrow job titles may also 
reduce workers’ perceptions of unfair treatment, and thereby “cool out” ambitious women and 
minorities. Individuals are more likely to accept differences in pay, work conditions or 
promotion opportunities when these differences are associated with different job categories.
121 
Furthermore, even where a perception of discrimination arises, narrow job definitions make it 
difficult to establish wage or rank norms based on similarity of tasks.   
Performance evaluations have been subjected to the closest scrutiny.  Field and 
laboratory studies suggest that raters may exercise gender bias even on supposedly “objective” 
performance evaluations.
122  Meta-analyses show a persistent gap in ratings of black and white 
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workers.
123  Some of the racial gap is due to the race of raters: whites tend to give higher job 
performance ratings to other whites, and blacks to other blacks.
124  This helps to explain the 
lower ratings for black employees, since most managers are white.
125  
Research also shows that firms may make personnel decisions based on factors other than 
performance ratings
126 or apply different standards to different groups.
127 Elvira and Zatzick find 
that controlling for performance scores, tenure, and job, whites were less likely than blacks to be 
laid off, and more likely to receive promotions, raises, and positive subsequent ratings.
128  
Roscigno’s analysis of civil rights complaints shows that minority workers are judged more 
severely than their white counterparts for subpar performance.
129 Castilla and Benard find, in a 
laboratory study, that subjects assign men higher bonuses than women with identical 
performance scores, but only when told that the employer is meritocratic.
130   
Salary classification systems have been cited in civil rights suits, by plaintiffs claiming 
that gender bias led to lower pay scales for jobs dominated by women.
131  Some argue that these 
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128  
128 Elvira & Zatzick, supra note 116, at 350-52. 
129 Vincent J. Roscigno & Lisette Garcia, Race Discrimination in Employment, in VINCENT J. ROSCIGNO, THE FACE 
OF DISCRIMINATION 21, 30 (2007) (arguing that “discriminatory firing is often masked…through allegations of poor 
performance” and that “[d]ifferential criteria and sanctions for supposedly poor performance are rampant”).  
130 Emilio J. Castilla & Stephen Benard, The Paradox of Meritocracy in Organizations, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 543, 543 
(2010). 
 
131 ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS, MARKETS AND 
UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA 42-45 (1999). 32	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systems permit too much wage discretion.  An early case study by Towers-Perrin consultants 
found that in one service sector firm, the only two corporate officers outside of their wage band 
were women, who were given “exceptional” salaries below the band.
132  On the other hand, 
Elvira and Graham find in a study of 8,000 workers in a financial firm that the remuneration 
disparity between men and women is greater for bonuses and incentive pay, distributed without 
formal rules, than for base salary, subject to formal rules.
133 
Taken together, the evidence we have to date on the effects of formal personnel 
procedures on workplace equality of opportunity provides scant support for the idea that these 
systems promote equality of opportunity.  None of the bureaucratic procedures has shown a 
consistent positive effect on workforce integration. Negative effects are commonly observed.  
Commonly, hiring and promotion procedures appear to codify disadvantage in formal 
organizational structure by formalizing selection and promotion criteria that advantage white 
men or by permitting bias to taint decision-making.  As the discussion above has suggested, job 
descriptions support gender and racial segregation that make unequal treatment appear to be part 
of the labor process rather than to be a consequence of discrimination.  Similarly, performance 
evaluations and salary classification systems can be used by managers to justify disparate 
treatment of different groups rather than prevent it.  The common pattern in the above discussion 
is that formal bureaucratic procedures may reproduce inequality rather than eradicating it by 
cloaking unequal treatment of women and minorities in neutral, universal, and rational 
procedures and practices.
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132 C.F. Fretz & Joanne Hayman,  Progress for Women? Men are Still More Equal, HARV. BUS. REV. 133, 137 
(1973). 
133 Marta M. Elvira & Mary E. Graham,  Not Just a Formality: Pay System Formalization and Sex-Related Earnings 
Effects, 13 ORGAN. SCI. 601, 601 (2002). 
134 Feminists have made this point powerfully. Kathy Ferguson argues that bureaucracy creates a “scientific 
organization of inequality.” KATHY E. FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREACRACY  7 (1984). Joan 
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3.2.  Programs to Eradicate Managerial Bias 
Social psychologists trace inequality to bias among managers.  Stereotyping is a natural 
cognitive mechanism that influences how people process information about others.  It is 
inevitable given our innocent tendency to make associations between categories and concepts.
135 
Social-cognition research shows that individuals unconsciously categorize others into in-groups 
and out-groups, and favor in-group members.
136 The implicit associations we make between race, 
gender, ethnicity, and social roles can have the effect of reproducing existing patterns of 
inequality.
137 This is especially true in contexts that reflect traditional gender and racial power 
relations, such as in an organization with a typical division of labor by race and sex.
138 	 ﾠManagers 
may unwittingly select women for jobs traditionally dominated by women and men for jobs 
dominated by men, with the effect of preserving between-group differences. 	 ﾠ
Once firms had initiated the bureaucratic anti-discrimination programs, described above, 
many turned to the task of minimizing the effects of cognitive bias.  They did this through two 
principal initiatives, diversity training to make managers and workers more aware of bias and its 
effects on hiring and promotion, and diversity performance evaluations designed to give 
managers feedback on their own work with women and minorities and to make clear that their 
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135 See generally Galen V. Bodenhausen, C. Neil Macrae & Jennifer Garst, Stereotypes in Thought and Deed: 
Social-Cognitive Origins of Intergroup Discrimination, in INTERGROUP COGNITION AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 
311 (Constantine Sedikides, John Schopler & Chester A. Insko, eds., 1990).  
136 Barbara Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321-22 (2000).  
137 See John T. Jost, Mahzarin Banaji & Brian A. Nosek, A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated 
Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 912 (2004) (“The 
evidence demonstrates that people are motivated not only to hold favorable attitudes toward themselves and toward 
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salaries, bonuses, and promotions would be based in part on diversity performance. However, 
studies show that diversity training and diversity performance evaluations have not promoted 
race and gender diversity at work.  	 ﾠ
Diversity training.  Employers added race relations sessions to their management 
training curricula in the 1960s.
139 Soon federal agencies hired the same trainers to enlighten 
federal employees.  By 1972, fifty thousand Social Security Administration staffers had 
completed similar workshops.
140 When the Bureau of National Affairs surveyed industry leaders 
in 1976, it found that nearly seventy percent offered equal opportunity training for managers.
141  
In the 1980s, diversity trainers shifted focus away from compliance with civil rights law 
and toward the business rationale for diversity.
142 They framed diversity training as part of an 
effort to rationalize the allocation of human resources, arguing that it was inefficient to allow 
managers to select workers based race or gender.
143 Diversity training became widely popular in 
large firms: a 1991 Conference Board survey found that 63 percent of leading employers offered 
diversity training.
144 Surveys that included smaller, medium sized, firms show that these 
trainings continued to spread and put the number at about 30 percent by the early 1990s and 
about 40 ten years later.
145  
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
139 Dobbin, supra note 2, at 144-45; see also Boyle, supra note 24, at 93 (describing seminars to make managers re-
examine their stereotypes about female employees). 
140 DOBBIN, supra note 2, at 146. 
141 Bureau of National Affairs, Equal Employment Opportunity: Programs and Results. PPF Survey No. 112 (1976) 
at 9.  
142 See Lauren B. Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller & Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of 
Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1590-91 (2001) (discussing how proponents of the new managerial rhetoric about 
diversity “explicitly disassociate their efforts from civil rights law” and expand the definition of diversity to include 
categories not protected by the law). 
143 WILLIAM JOHNSON & ARNOLD PACKER, Workforce 2000: Work and Workers for the Twenty First Century. 
Indianapolis: Hudson Institute; U.S. Department of Labor. (1987).  
144 Mary J. Winterle, Workforce Diversity: Corporate Challenges, Corporate Responses. No. 1013, pt. 21 (1992). 
145 Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of 
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While diversity training was the flagship practice in many diversity management 
programs, it did not prove to increase workforce diversity. In our analysis of survey data from a 
national sample of 830 employers between 1971 and 2002 we find that diversity training is 
followed by a 7 percent decline in the odds of black women in management, even though it is 
also followed by a 10 percent increase in the odds of Hispanic women in management.
146  
Previous studies had similarly found little effect of diversity training, although most focused on 
short term changes in attitudes and self-reported behavior, not on workforce composition over 
decades.
147  A number of case studies found that training can elicit backlash from white men.
148  
Two diversity training experts report that after attending the sensitivity trainings that became 
popular in the mid-1980s, trainees often “left confused, angry, or with more animosity toward 
differences” rather than less.
149 Experienced trainers report that they often encounter anger and 
resistance.
150 Field and laboratory studies also suggest that training may reinforce stereotypes 
and exacerbate discrimination.
151  It is possible that these negative reactions are a response to the 
form of training, and the failure of trainers to cause participants to internalize the need for equal 
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146 Frank Dobbin, Alexandra Kalev & Erin L. Kelly, Diversity Management in Corporate America, 6 CONTEXTS 21, 
24 (2007). 
147 See K. Kraiger, J. Kevin Ford & Eduardo Salas, Application of Cognitive, Skill-Based, and Affective Theories of 
Learning Outcomes to New Methods of Training Evaluation, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 311, 319-20 (1993) 
(discussing how to measure attitudinal outcomes of diversity training using self-reported data); Carol T. Kulik & 
Loriann Roberson, Common Goals and Golden Opportunities: Evaluations of Diversity Education in Academic and 
Organizational Settings, 7 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 309, 313 (2008) (stating that most evaluations of 
diversity training focus on its impact on participants’ atittudes). 
148 See Heather MacDonald, Cashing in on Affirmative Action: The Diversity Industry, The New Republic, July 5, 
1993, 22, at 25 (“As diversity programs proliferate across corporate America, group infighting has become a 
problem second only to ‘backlash’ by white men.”); Rynes & Rosen, supra note 145, at 67 (discussing possible 
negative outcomes from diversity training, including “backlash by white males”).  
149 Rohini Anand & Mary-Frances Winters, A Retrospective View of Corporate Diversity Training from 1964 to the 
Present, 7 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 356, 361 (2008).   
150 Carol T. Kulik, Molly B. Pepper, Loriann Roberson & Sharon K. PARKER, The Rich Get Richer:  Predicting 
Participation in Voluntary Diversity Training, 28 J. Organ. Behav. 753, 754 (2007). 
151 See FREDERICK R. LYNCH, THE DIVERSITY MACHINE:  THE DRIVE TO CHANGE THE WHITE MALE WORKPLACE 
18-19 (1997) (arguing that diversity policies “encourage the concept that an individual’s thought and style can be 
deduced from his or her ethnic or gender identity”); Katherine C. Naff & J. Edward Kellough, Ensuring Employment 
Equity: Are Federal Diversity Programs Making a Difference?, 26 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1307, 1310 (2003) 
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opportunity in the workplace.  Most diversity training programs are mandatory, are directed at 
managers, and focus on legal liability.  According to social psychologists, both the lack of 
voluntary participation and the emphasis on sanctions may inhibit the internalization of motives 
and enhance externalization and resistance.
152 
  Other studies find weak positive effects of training on attitudes in the short term. Kulik 
and Roberson found 51 studies of organizational diversity training efforts that used either pre- 
and post-test assessments or a post-test control group.
153 Most reviewed studies found improved 
knowledge of, or attitudes toward, diversity, although a number of those studies found only 
modest improvement on one of several measures.  Few looked beyond the immediate post-
treatment test, and none looked at changes beyond one year out.
154  
Diversity performance evaluations. In addition to adopting training programs to try to 
influence managers’ attitudes about diversity, corporations have also adopted evaluation systems 
in which managers are judged based on their progress in diversity goals.   In an article in the 
Harvard Business Review in 1974, Theodore Purcell championed General Electric’s 
“measurement system with rewards and penalties designed to produce behavioral changes in 
managers.”
155  The equal opportunity performance evaluation was already becoming popular.  A 
company president of a leading firm that the Towers-Perrin consultancy studied in 1973 argued 
that firms must “place responsibility for achieving equal opportunity objectives where it 
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70 Rev. Econ. Stud. 498 489-520 (2003); LEON Festinger & James M. Carlsmith. 1959. Cognitive Consequences of 
Forced Compliance 58 J. Abnorm. Soc. Psych.   203-10  209 210 (1959) 
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154 KATERINA BEZRUKOVA & JOSHI  B. APARNA & KAREN A. JEHN, Can We Teach Diversity?  A Review of Diversity 
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rightfully belongs: with operating management, with each of us.”
156 In the Bureau of National 
Affairs’ 1976 study of leading firms, four in ten manufacturers, three in ten service firms, and 
two in ten non-profits had equal opportunity performance evaluations.
157  In a more 
representative 2002 survey of American middling and large employers, only 4% of the sample 
had them by 1985, but by 2002 nearly 1 in 5 firms had them.
158  
Studies of the effects of diversity performance evaluations, however, are not promising.  
Firms that create diversity performance evaluations see small decreases in the share of black men 
in the ranks of management.
159  However, in firms that have assigned responsibility for diversity, 
to a manager or taskforce, the negative effect does not appear.
160  This suggests that monitoring 
can prevent adverse effects of diversity evaluations.   
Attempts to reduce cognitive bias, through diversity training and diversity performance 
evaluations, appear to be ineffective. Perhaps they elicit unintended cognitive reactions that 
enhance exclusion rather than inclusion.  What is common to both diversity training and 
performance evaluations is that they place blame for workforce segregation on managers.  We 
suspect that this message does not help rally managers to the cause. As discussed earlier, social 
psychologists have long argued that internalization of motives is less likely to occur under 
conditions of strong sanctions and lack of choice. Both programs create these conditions.  The 
programs also give managers few tools for dealing with diversity in the workplace.  As we will 
see in Part IV, successful programs are those that empower managers to act.  
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157 Bureau of National Affairs Equal Employment Opportunity:  Programs and Results, supra note 141, at 9. 
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3.3.  Affinity Networks  
Network theorists in sociology argued from the early 1970s that people find jobs through 
network contacts, and that promotion depends as much on who you know as on what you 
know.
161  While white men often have ties to other white men in positions of advantage, women 
and minorities are often stymied in job search and advancement by poor contacts with those in 
power.
162 Since the early 1980s, diversity managers and workers themselves have called for 
affinity networks, bringing together minorities and women based on shared status characteristics.   
For example, Cisco Systems has a Women’s Action Network; the Cisco Black Employee 
Network; the Cisco Latino Network; the Cisco Asian Affinity Network; the Gay Lesbian 
Bisexual Transgender and Advocates Network; and Indians Connected.
163   Affinity network 
activities at various corporations include regular brownbag lunches, on-site meetings with 
speakers, and lavish national conferences.
164  Networks provide a place for members to meet 
with similarly situated others and share information and career advice.  Affinity networks had 
spread to about 20 percent of a broad national sample of medium and large firms by 2002.
165  
These network programs, sometimes labeled “affinity groups” or “employee resource 
groups,” have not shown promising effects on inclusion.  Qualitative research show that whites 
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AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 181-86 (1977) (discussing the power that comes from social connections with 
sponsors, peers, and subordinates); Ronald S. Burt, The Gender of Social Capital, 10 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 5, 6 
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162 See Herminia Ibarra, Homophily and Differential Returns: Sex Differences in Network Structure and Access in an 
Advertising Firm, 34 Admin. Sci. Quart. 422, 423-28 (1992) (surveying research on access to networks based on 
gender); Herminia Ibarra, Race, Opportunity and Diversity of Social Circles in Managerial Networks, 38 Acad. 
Manage J. 673, 674-82 (1995) (surveying research on access to networks based on race). 
163 Cisco System website accessed Jan. 3, 2012 at 
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can develop negative attitudes toward African-American organizing efforts.
166  One quantitative 
study showed that networking is followed by a small rise in white women in management and a 
small decline in black men, with no effects on other groups.
167   It may be that networks of black 
workers strengthen racial boundaries and intergroup tension at the workplace. Some studies, 
however, suggest that employee mobilization efforts can shape corporate diversity programs. 
Network programs can help to mobilize support for new progressive employment programs.
168 
Hence, networking programs may have indirect, positive effects on workforce diversity. 
 
3.4.  Grievance SystemsBy the late 1960s, personnel experts were promoting civil rights 
grievance procedures based on the 1930s union model.
169  Gloria Gery advocated a 
“grievance system…to assure that all employees have an opportunity to resolve 
complaints…without having to appeal to external organizations such as the EEOC.”
170 
The idea was to intercept civil rights complaints before they reached the government, 
and to remedy underlying problems through local conciliation.   
The Conference Board found that by 1979, 88 percent of non-union firms with over 5000 
workers had grievance procedures. Among large union firms, 67 percent had procedures for non-
union workers.
171  Some of these predated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and were not designed to 
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groups in pressuring firms to adopt progressive programs). 
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 ﾠJ.	 ﾠ203	 ﾠ(1977),	 ﾠ
reprinted	 ﾠin	 ﾠREADINGS	 ﾠIN	 ﾠHUMAN	 ﾠRESOURCE	 ﾠMANAGEMENT	 ﾠ361-ﾭ‐75,	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address civil rights grievances, but longitudinal studies show that most were adopted in response 
to federal civil rights law.  In Edelman’s 1989 survey, 31 percent of firms had installed 
grievances procedure to handle discrimination complaints.
172  A 1986 survey found that only 4 
percent of employers added a non-union grievance procedure between 1964 and 1972, but 35 
percent added one between 1973 and 1986, after civil rights law was bolstered in the early 
1970s.
173   
Evidence that grievance procedures can remedy civil rights complaints is weak.  On the 
positive side, in an analysis of evidence from workplace ethnographies, Lopez, Hodson, and 
Roscigno find that grievance mechanisms are associated with lower levels of sexual harassment 
though with no change in the levels of general harassment.
174 Yet in a 1970 Conference Board 
study, most personnel managers reported that their grievance systems did not reduce complaints 
to the government.
175  Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger found, in a sample of 200 employers in 
1989, that internal grievance procedures did not reduce complaints to external regulators.
176 Nor 
did the courts recognize their efficacy.  In tens of thousands of published rulings in civil rights 
cases up to 1986, Edelman and colleagues found only four in which judges took procedures into 
account in assessing liability.
177    
 
3.5.  Sexual Harassment Training 
Sexual harassment protections have become central to many corporate diversity management 
programs.  Harassment was not mentioned in the Civil Rights Act, but feminist law professor 
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173 Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 47, at 802. 
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Catharine MacKinnon argued that harassment at work should be treated as sex discrimination 
under Title VII.
178 The courts at first balked, refusing to treat workplace sex harassment as sex 
discrimination  In 1976 and 1977 three federal courts found that retaliatory actions against 
female employees who refused male supervisors’ sexual advances constituted sex discrimination 
under Title VII.
179  The Supreme Court ruled in 1986 that hostile environment harassment was 
covered by the Civil Rights Act.
180  In 1998, dual Supreme Court decisions favored both 
grievance procedures and harassment training as anti-harassment measures.
181 
The court rulings did not require specific measures for preventing sexual harassment, but 
personnel experts sketched law-like procedures designed to convince both executives and judges 
of their legal standing.
182  Grievance procedures, they argued, could intercept harassment 
complaints before they reached federal agencies and simultaneously telegraph the firm’s 
commitment to ending harassment.
183 	 ﾠ
By that time, grievance procedures were already ubiquitous in American firms, thanks to 
the advocacy of HR experts.
184 In 1991, the Wall Street Journal reported, harassment training 
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775, 807-08 (1998) (same). 
182 See, e.g., Jeri Spann, Dealing Effectively with Sexual Harassment: Some Practical Lessons from One City's 
Experience, 19 Pub. Person. Manage. 53, 67-68 (1990) (recommending clear anti-harassment policies and 
procedures for investigating and resolving complaints). 
183 See Michele  Hoyman & Ronda Robinson, Interpreting the New Sexual Harassment Guidelines, 43 Pers. J. 996, 
999  (1980) (“The foundation of an employer’s compliance program is a strong statement from top management that 
sexual harassment will not be tolerated”); Patricia Linenberger & Timothy J. Keaveny, Sexual Harassment: The 
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had nearly saturated the Fortune 500.
185     By 1997, 95 percent of employers in a broad national 
sample, including medium-sized and large firms, reported that they had sexual harassment 
grievance procedures in place and over 70 percent reported that they had anti-harassment 
training.
186 	 ﾠ
###As with grievance procedures, there is little evidence that the training prevents 
harassment.  Susan Bisom-Rapp’s review of scholarly research unearths no evidence that 
training reduces the incidence of harassment.
187  All in all, the jury is still out on whether either 
of these interventions functions to reduce the incidence of harassment.  
 
4.  Progressive Programs that Have Increased Workforce Diversity 
We now turn to programs that research has shown to be effective at promoting workforce 
integration. The innovations that promote workforce diversity are targeted recruitment efforts, 
skill and management training, mentoring, and diversity officers and taskforces.  First, it appears 
that diversity programs succeed when they use active measures to diversify the pipeline: identify 
women and minority candidates, through recruitment, and provide them with skills, through 
training.  Second, mentoring, taskforces, and diversity staff members have one thing in common 
that distinguishes them from diversity training and performance evaluations: they directly engage 
managers solving the problems of identifying, appointing, and retaining women and minorities.  
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4.1.  Recruitment and Training Programs 
Perhaps the most straightforward way to increase the share of women and minorities in the 
workforce is to increase their share in the labor pool. Among the very first steps firms took in 
reaction to antidiscrimination legislation of the 1960s was to install targeted recruitment 
programs and special training programs to increase opportunity for minorities.   
Many leading firms—Lockheed, Proctor and Gamble, Chase Manhattan Bank—had 
longstanding recruitment programs targeting white men. They recruited managers by visiting 
colleges and universities, and recruited line workers and bank tellers by visiting high schools.
188  
After the civil rights revolution, firms extended these programs to target blacks, and America’s 
historically black colleges soon faced an onslaught of recruiters.  Lockheed brought busloads of 
black college students from Tuskegee Institute in Alabama on recruitment visits to their Georgia 
plant, as well as counselors from segregated black high schools.
189  Howard saw 400 recruiters 
visit in 1964 and again in 1965 for a graduating class of 450.
190 A 1967 Bureau of National 
Affairs survey found that among leading employers, 31 percent had created new recruitment 
systems for blacks between 1965 and 1967.
191 
 More than half of the firms were now advertising 
through organizations like the NAACP and the Urban League. A third sent recruiters to 
“predominantly Negro high schools and colleges,” and a fifth were recruiting at women’s 
colleges.
192 
Firms also created training programs with the goal of helping women, African-Americans 
and Latinos move into skilled jobs and management jobs.  As of 1960, most companies had not 
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enrolled any women or minorities in management training, according to Bureau of National 
Affairs (BNA) studies, but by 1966, 31 percent of large employers offered management training 
and 21 percent had special programs to enroll minorities in training.
 193 Employers with skill and 
management training programs now began to enroll blacks.
194   By 1965, GM had enrolled 
minorities in its apprenticeship programs and its own engineering school.
195  In Newark, blacks 
took up 80% of Western Electric’s training spots by 1967.
196 Between 1967 and 1985, the 
number of employers enrolling women and minorities in management training and 
apprenticeships grew steadily.
197  By 2002, 68 percent of firms offered management training and 
20 percent of all firms targeted women or minorities for inclusion in management training.
198     
Research has shown that targeted recruitment programs have been effective. Analyzing 
data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, Holzer and Neumark find that firms that add 
recruitment and screening programs for women and minorities are indeed more likely to hire 
them.
 199  Edelmen and Petterson similarly find that active recruitment programs are associated 
with increased workforce diversity.
200 Konrad and Linnehan show that “identity-conscious” 
human resource management practices, designed specifically to attract and retain women and 
minorities, are associated with greater gender and racial diversity in the ranks of management.
201  
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These “identity-conscious” practices aim to increase the workforce diversity by closely 
monitoring personnel decisions made about employees from minority groups and by “making 
special efforts to employ and promote the career progress” of minorities.
202  By contrast, some 
studies show that training programs that have the potential to reduce gender and racial gap in 
skill, are rarely offered to women and minorities, despite high profile initiatives by large firms to 
draw women and minorities to training programs.
203  
 
4.2.  Mentoring Programs 
Research	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠmentoring	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
promotions,	 ﾠearned	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠand	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsatisfied	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpay	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwith	 ﾠless	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠmentoring.
204 Young and inexperienced protégés receive 
psychological and career support from their mentors and learn how their mentors have navigated 
into managerial positions. Having personal guidance and support at work evidently facilitates 
career development.
205 Mentors confer key career resources on their protégés, such as visibility 
and access to prestigious tasks, which workers with no mentors may lack. One study of random 
mentor assignment within a single firm found that mentees have improved social networks and 
tactical knowledge, which may help their careers.
206  
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Management psychologists have argued that corporations should extend the advantages 
of mentoring to the historically disadvantaged by creating formal mentoring programs that match 
aspiring female and minority managers with volunteer mentors.
207 A study from the early 1980s 
of nine firms famed for their commitment to fairness found that every one promoted 
mentoring.
208 By the early 1990s, two studies showed that 20 to 30 percent of America’s biggest 
firms had formal mentoring programs.
209  In a broader, sample of American firms, only 4 percent 
had special mentoring programs for women and minorities by 1990, but 10 percent had 
mentoring programs by 2002.
210  
In our studies, mentoring programs show strong positive effects on black women, and 
Hispanic and Asian men and women in management.
211  In a report prepared for a taskforce of 
the National Academies of Science, we examined the effects of mentoring programs in different 
industries, finding that in industries with significant numbers of college educated non-managerial 
workers, who are eligible for promotion to management jobs, mentoring programs led to 
increases in all seven historically disadvantaged groups in management (white women, and black, 
Hispanic, and Asian-American men and women).
212  Others have found similar positive effects 
of mentoring on African-Americans.
213  On the negative side, studies have found that cross-race 
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mentoring relationships are harder to form and maintain.
214 One study also found that same-sex 
mentoring does not improve academic job placement for female graduate students in economics, 
likely because female mentors are not well enough established in their fields to improve career 
outcomes for their female graduate protégés.
215 These two studies indicate that those designing 
mentoring programs should consider the identities of both mentors and mentees. Overall, 
mentoring programs appear to be highly effective in helping white women and members of 
minority groups move into management.   
 
4.3.  Programs that Establish Authority for Diversity Management 
 Studies find that companies that give staff members direct responsibility for managing diversity 
efforts achieve gains in the number of women and minorities in higher-level jobs.	 ﾠLarge 
corporations, in particular, have assigned responsibility for managing diversity to full time 
diversity staff members, sometimes with their own staffs.  The Affirmative Action Officer, the 
Equal Opportunity Office, and the Race Relations Taskforce of the 1970s were often replaced, or 
augmented, with the Diversity Manager, Diversity Department, or Diversity Council in the 
1980s.
216  Assigning someone to take charge of diversity built on the oldest principle from 
management theory: to achieve a new goal, the first step is to put someone in charge.  	 ﾠ
Diversity managers and departments.  In the face of statutes, bureaucratic regulations, 
executive orders, and case law, many corporations of the 1970s hired full time staff members, or 
created new departments, to manage their equal opportunity and diversity programs.
217  A full 
time diversity staffer, according to consultants, can focus attention on managing diversity.  A 
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recent study shows that the appointment of a full time diversity staffer in the average firm leads, 
for instance, to a 10 percent increase in the proportion of white women in management and a 15 
percent increase in the proportions of both black men and black women in management over 
about five years.
218  The same research has shown that diversity managers play a role in ensuring 
the effective implementation of other corporate equality and diversity programs.
219 When it 
comes to separate departments promoting diversity or equal opportunity Edelman and Petterson 
show that diversity departments increase gender and racial diversity by promoting diversity 
recruitment programs, which in turn increase workforce diversity.
220  
Diversity taskforce. Diversity consultants promoted diversity “taskforces” that can 
engage managers from across the firm in seeking solutions to stubborn problems of recruitment, 
retention, and promotion.
221  The idea was to hold regular meetings among people from different 
departments who would talk over problems faced by the firm and brainstorm for solutions.
222 
Our own 2002 survey shows that taskforces began to spread in the wider population of firms in 
the late 1980s and had reached 20 percent of firms by 2002.
223  
An analysis of national survey data shows that following the establishment of diversity 
taskforces, firms see significant increases of white women, and black, Hispanic, and Asian-
American men and women in management.
224  Furthermore, the presence of a diversity taskforce 
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in an organization improves the operation of most other diversity programs.
225  
What makes these various innovations successful?  The innovations that promote 
workforce diversity are targeted recruitment efforts, skill and management training, mentoring, 
and diversity officers and taskforces.  Broadly speaking, we can identify several mechanisms of 
success. First, it appears that diversity programs succeed when they use active measures to 
increase the diversity of the candidate pool by identifying women and minority candidates 
through targeted recruitment, and by providing women and minorities with the right skills 
through training.   
The other successful innovations, mentoring, taskforces, and diversity staff members, 
have one thing in common: they directly engage managers in managing diversity efforts, in 
solving the problem of identifying, appointing, and retaining women and minority candidates.  
We suspect that one reason this makes innovations successful is that it prevents decoupling. 
When manager ignore innovations and go on with business as usual, the innovations become 
decoupled from everyday practice and have no effect on it. Decoupling may occur because 
executives establish programs in order to create an appearance of compliance with no intention 
to alter their daily routine. Diversity managers and taskforces may reduce decoupling.
226 Those 
appointed to take charge of diversity become invested in and promoters of the goal. Indeed an 
analysis of diversity programs has found that programs that are ineffective and even harmful, 
such as diversity training and performance evaluations, are less likely to backfire in firms with 
diversity managers or taskforces.
227 
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In interviews, managers and executives tell us that diversity managers and taskforces are 
effective because they identify specific problems and remedies. If the taskforce sees that the 
company has not been recruiting African-American engineers, it will suggest sending recruiters 
to historically black colleges. If a company has trouble retaining women, the diversity manager 
may talk to women at risk of leaving and try to work out arrangements that will keep them on the 
job. Managers and taskforces feel accountable for change, and they monitor quarterly 
employment data to see if their efforts are paying off.  Taskforces may be so widely effective, 
some diversity managers tell us, because they cause managers from different departments to 
“buy into” the goal of diversity. Taken together evidence from quantitative and qualitative 
research suggests that when managers are equipped with tasks and tools, organizational goals are 
more likely to be achieved than when managers are identified as the source of the problem.   
 
5.  Conclusion  
American companies have adopted a series of progressive employment programs that have 
altered the way managers recruit, hire, discipline, promote, compensate, and discharge workers.   
Corporations and their personnel officers selected the specific programs from the start, for 
federal regulations outlawing employment discrimination left firms largely to their own devices 
when it came to compliance.  One consequence is that the coverage of corporate diversity 
measures remains spotty across firms.  Diversity training is by far the most popular of the core 
diversity programs, and only some 40 percent of middling to large firms have adopted it.
228  
Other highly touted innovations, such as mentoring and diversity taskforces, are found in only 10 
to 20 percent of American workplaces, according to data from national samples.
229   
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Thus the first question we have addressed concerns the forces that lead firms to behave as 
progressive actors, embracing equal opportunity and diversity programs.  Longitudinal studies of 
the adoption of these programs by U.S. corporations shed light on why the take-up of programs 
has been uneven, and why the take-up of some programs has stalled.  Studies of program 
innovation in the 1960s and 1970s identified public policy as the driving force behind the 
creation of special recruitment programs, equal opportunity offices, and bureaucratic 
employment practices.  New regulations, and reinforcement of existing regulations, led firms to 
embrace progressive policies.  Employers that enjoyed substantial public visibility were more 
likely to embrace these innovations.  But after about 1980, a different dynamic took over, as the 
Reagan Administration curtailed enforcement activities and as human resources experts began to 
replace the legal rationale for progressive programs with a business rationale, under the banner 
of diversity management.   
From the early 1980s, corporate embrace of progressive employment programs was driven 
largely by advocacy from the personnel profession, by advocacy from women in management, 
and by progressive cultures at both the industry and firm levels.  Regulation played less of a role 
and social norms played more of a role.  Now innovations are put into place among firms that 
have already made a commitment to progressive employment policies and those that are in 
industries where progressive innovations are common.  Adoption of new diversity innovations is 
now highly path dependent.  Progressive firms, surrounded by progressive industries, continue to 
install new diversity measures even in the absence of congressional and judicial headlines.   
The second question we address concerns the efficacy of these progressive employment 
programs.  Studies show that employment segregation by race and gender declined significantly 52	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in the 1960s and 1970s, but has changed little since then.
230   Are the progressive employment 
programs that corporations have continued to install since Reagan cut back federal enforcement 
contributing to greater opportunity for white women and members of minority groups?   
The record is mixed.  Treating diversity like any other business goal - putting someone in 
charge and focusing on implementation and outcomes – has direct positive effects on diversity.  
The assignment of responsibility to a full time diversity staffer, or a diversity taskforce, leads to 
increases in diversity even among management jobs.  Moreover, firms that assign responsibility 
for diversity management see increases in the effectiveness of other programs, and decreases in 
the likelihood of adverse consequences.  We suspect that these managerial innovations prevent 
decoupling, and improve implementation of other diversity innovations.
231 And while assigning 
an individual or group responsibility for promoting diversity is effective, measures that 
individualize the blame for disparities, such as diversity performance evaluations and diversity 
training, are not. Those popular, and expensive, remedies have shown little evidence of efficacy.   
Mentoring programs are also widely effective at promoting diversity in the management 
ranks.  Like the assignment of diversity managers and taskforces, mentoring gives corporate 
leaders a direct role in the promotion of diversity. Unlike diversity performance evaluations and 
training, mentor assignment gives managers a positive role in the promotion of diversity.  Unlike 
networking programs, mentoring programs help women and minorities build ties with those in 
powerful positions. The social ties offered by networking programs are typically to those in 
similar lower level positions. As we have seen such programs do not foster managerial diversity.  
More research is needed, to be sure, on why popular diversity performance evaluations, 
diversity training, and affinity network programs have not promoted workforce diversity.  
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Research to date is consistent with the view that these programs fail by identifying managers as 
the source of organizational bias, rather than as the solution to the problem of diversity 
management. Research, as well, is needed to understand why hugely popular formal hiring and 
promotion innovations have not been shown to lead to increases in workforce diversity.   
The findings from extant research point to managers as powerful actors in shaping 
organizational behavior. If progressive innovations vary in their effectiveness depending on the 
way they engage managers, we need to learn more about managers’ reactions and actions in 
relation to corporate diversity missions and goals. We need to learn more both about the ways 
managers enhance implementation, as the interviews discussed above suggest, and about the 
ways in which mangers forestall implementation.   
  The findings have several tangible public policy implications. First among these is that 
federal equal opportunity and affirmative action regulations no longer appear to be contributing 
directly to the diffusion of progressive corporate diversity programs. In contrast to early research,  
studies pertaining the period after 1980, have found that being a federal contractor, facing an 
affirmative action compliance review, and facing a discrimination lawsuit do not increase firm’s 
propensity to embrace diversity programs.
232  To the extent that these programs mediate equal 
opportunity law, as some of them do, policymakers might consider how to redesign public policy 
interventions to encourage firms to adopt progressive employment policies.   
  Second is that the programs that have become popular under the banner of diversity 
management have quite mixed effects on actual workforce diversity.  Policymakers and judges 
need to understand which corporate programs have contributed to the integration of the 
workforce, so that they can design public policies, and injunctive relief in discrimination cases, 
based on evidence about how firms can open opportunity.  Thus, a recent survey shows that two 
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times as many firms have diversity training programs, which have proven ineffective, as have 
mentoring programs, which have proven highly effective.
233 Meanwhile, many programs that 
have proven effective in the past, notably special recruitment for women and minorities and 
special programs to enroll them in management training, have lost their caché in the corporate 
world.  	 ﾠOur	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠshould	 ﾠrethink	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠchoices,	 ﾠ
abandoning	 ﾠineffective	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠones.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 
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